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The Dark Side of Relational
Leadership: Positive and Negative
Reciprocity as Fundamental Drivers
of Follower’s Intended Pro-leader
and Pro-self Unethical Behavior
Tim Vriend1* , Ramzi Said1, Onne Janssen1 and Jennifer Jordan2
1 Department of Human Resource Management and Organizational Behavior, University of Groningen, Groningen,
Netherlands, 2 IMD, Lausanne, Switzerland
In this study, we use a social exchange perspective to examine when [i.e., high- vs.
low-quality leader–member exchange (LMX)], why (i.e., positive vs. negative reciprocity),
and how (i.e., pro-leader vs. pro-self unethical behavior) followers consider unethical
behavior that either benefits the leader or the self. Across an experimental and a
time-split survey study, we find that high-quality LMX relationships motivate pro-leader
unethical intention as a means to satisfy positive reciprocity motives, and that low-
quality LMX relationships motivate pro-self unethical intention as a means to satisfy
negative reciprocity motives. Importantly, our studies demonstrate that it is crucial to
incorporate both positive and negative reciprocity motives when studying the effects of
LMX. Implications of these results for social exchange theory, LMX, and the broader
literature of (self- and other-serving) unethical behavior are discussed.
Keywords: leader–member exchange, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, social exchange theory, pro-
leader unethical intention, pro-self unethical intention
INTRODUCTION
Unethical behavior, despite being costly and detrimental for organizations (Giacalone and
Promislo, 2010), is quite prevalent and is expected to become even more prevalent in the future
(Rickman and Witt, 2007). Research examining the predictors and mechanisms of unethical
behavior has greatly increased in the last decades (Treviño et al., 2014). Several studies have
investigated what leaders, as central gatekeepers of appropriate conduct, can do to prevent unethical
behavior among their followers (Treviño and Brown, 2005; Brown and Treviño, 2006; Kalshoven
et al., 2016). The quality of the leader–member exchange (LMX) relationship between leaders and
followers (Dienesch and Liden, 1986; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Settoon et al., 1996) appears to play
a prominent role in preventing employee unethical behavior. Under the assumption that followers
aim to positively reciprocate high-quality LMX relationships, initial studies have demonstrated
that LMX is negatively related to self-serving behaviors such as deviance, counterproductive work
behaviors, and withdrawal (Gerstner and Day, 1997; El Akremi et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013;
Jawahar et al., 2018).
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Interestingly, however, under the same positive reciprocity
assumption, more recent studies have demonstrated that LMX
is positively related to other-serving undesirable behaviors as
pro-leader unethical behavior (Bryant and Merritt, 2019). In
these recent studies, followers are assumed to use pro-leader
unethical behaviors to positively reciprocate the benefits they
receive from their leaders in high-quality LMX relationships.
As such, this positive reciprocity mechanism is used in
research to explain both why high-quality LMX relationships
demotivate (El Akremi et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013; Jawahar
et al., 2018) and motivate (Umphress et al., 2010; Bryant and
Merritt, 2019) unethical behaviors. That is, the negative effects
of LMX on self-serving unethical behavior and its positive
effects on other-serving unethical behavior are assumed to
be driven by the same motivational mechanism of positive
reciprocity. We argue that this one-sided focus on positive
reciprocity motives derived from high-quality LMX relationships
foregoes the role of negative reciprocity motives sparked by
low-quality LMX relationships (Uhl-Bien and Maslyn, 2003).
While the (lack of) benefits to an exchange may be an
important motivator for followers, it seems equally feasible
that negative reciprocity either motivates self-serving unethical
behavior or demotivates other-serving unethical behavior.
Exploring these underlying differences between positive and
negative reciprocity motives is imperative in understanding
why, when, and how LMX relates to unethical behaviors
that serve either the follower or others, and may be crucial
in developing interventions that aim to reduce all types of
unethical behaviors.
Drawing from the social exchange theory (Gouldner, 1960;
Blau, 1964) and the LMX theory (Liden and Graen, 1980;
Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995), we argue that the quality of the
LMX relationship motivates followers to either positively or
negatively reciprocate this relationship, leading them to consider
either pro-leader or pro-self unethical behavior. We provide
empirical evidence for our proposed conceptual model across an
experimental study and a time-split field study. By presenting a
coherent framework that explains when (i.e., high- vs. low-quality
LMX), why (i.e., positive vs. negative reciprocity), and how (i.e.,
pro-leader vs. pro-self unethical behavior) individuals consider
unethical behavior as a means of reciprocating exchanges
with their leader, we contribute to the literatures on social
exchange theory (e.g., Gouldner, 1960; Blau, 1964), LMX (e.g.,
Dienesch and Liden, 1986; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Settoon
et al., 1996), and (self- and other-serving) unethical behavior
(e.g., Umphress et al., 2010; Treviño et al., 2014; Bryant and
Merritt, 2019). Our specific contributions are fourfold. First,
although previous research has demonstrated that LMX can both
demotivate (El Akremi et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013; Jawahar
et al., 2018) and motivate (Umphress et al., 2010; Bryant and
Merritt, 2019) unethical behaviors, our study is among the
first to directly contrast these motivations in a single study.
Second, although previous research has certainly suggested that
reciprocal social exchange mechanisms play a crucial role in
motivating unethical behavior (e.g., Umphress et al., 2010;
Umphress and Bingham, 2011; Miao et al., 2013; Effelsberg
et al., 2014; Effelsberg and Solga, 2015; Kalshoven et al., 2016;
Kong, 2016; Bryant and Merritt, 2019; Lee et al., 2019), none
of these have explicitly tested how reciprocity motives facilitate
the relationship between LMX and unethical behavior. This
is especially important in light of recent criticisms of LMX
research that the social exchange component is often ignored
altogether (Gottfredson et al., 2020). Third, although LMX
can motivate both positive and negative reciprocity motives,
research tends to limit itself to the positive aspect (Uhl-
Bien and Maslyn, 2003). Our study demonstrates that positive
and negative reciprocity entail different motives that predict
different intended unethical behaviors in meaningfully different
ways. Finally, given the prevalence and importance of LMX
relationships (Henderson et al., 2009) and the destructive nature
of unethical behavior (Giacalone and Promislo, 2010), our study
offers practitioners an important consideration when developing
LMX relationships.
LEADER–MEMBER EXCHANGE THEORY
The LMX theory (Dienesch and Liden, 1986; Graen and Uhl-
Bien, 1995; Settoon et al., 1996) explains how the relationships
between leaders and followers develop (role theory; Graen, 1976)
and how this relationship formation determines interactions
between leaders and followers (social exchange theory; Gouldner,
1960; Blau, 1964). According to the LMX theory, leaders and
followers go through role-taking and role-making processes to
determine what both parties can expect from one another (for
a review, see Dulebohn et al., 2012). Leaders and followers
either develop low-quality economic exchange relationships
where leaders reward followers for performing the duties as
specified in their work contract, or develop more high-quality
social exchange relationships where leaders additionally exchange
affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect (Liden and
Maslyn, 1998). The quality of the LMX relationship refers to the
extent to which followers perceive that an exchange of social
resources is absent (i.e., a low-quality LMX relationship) or
present (i.e., a high-quality LMX relationship) (Lord and Maher,
1991; Engle and Lord, 1997).
The basic use of social exchange theory in LMX is as
follows. As leaders have limited resources to establish exchange
relationships with followers (Liden and Graen, 1980; Graen and
Uhl-Bien, 1995), they tend to differentiate among followers and
develop high-quality social exchange relationships with some
followers, while maintaining low-quality economic exchange
relationships with others. This differentiation implies that
followers consider both the quality of their own LMX relationship
and that of their peers to determine the extent to which they
are obligated to engage in positive reciprocity, where benefit is
returned with benefit, or in negative reciprocity, where harm
is returned with harm (Gouldner, 1960; Blau, 1964). Followers
who perceive a higher-quality LMX relationship with their leader
will feel privileged relative to peers with lower-quality LMX
relationships and will interpret their relatively high-quality social
exchanges with their leader as a unique benefit (Henderson et al.,
2009). This unique benefit then instills a positive reciprocity
motive among these followers (Gouldner, 1960; Perugini et al.,
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2003; Brandes and Franck, 2012), where followers are motivated
to return the benefit they received with equal benefit. In contrast,
followers who perceive a lower-quality LMX relationship will feel
deprived relative to peers with higher-quality LMX relationships,
which will lead to perceptions of unfair treatment (Folger and
Martin, 1986; Masterson et al., 2000) and dissatisfaction with
their leader (McClane, 1991). This deprivation then instills a
negative reciprocity motive among these followers (Uhl-Bien and
Maslyn, 2003; Eisenberger et al., 2004), which may motivate them
to return the harm they received with equal harm.
Although the duality of positive and negative reciprocity
is a necessary element of LMX relationships, most studies on
LMX are limited to positive reciprocity (Uhl-Bien and Maslyn,
2003). Specifically, LMX research typically uses the positive
reciprocity route to argue for relationships with undesirable
behavior, both of the kind that benefits employees themselves
(El Akremi et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013; Jawahar et al.,
2018) and those that benefit others (Umphress et al., 2010;
Bryant and Merritt, 2019). Although certain studies have
demonstrated that general positive reciprocity beliefs moderate
the effects of LMX and organizational identification on unethical
behavior (Umphress et al., 2010; Bryant and Merritt, 2019),
no studies known to us have empirically investigated the
intervening effects of positive reciprocity motivated by high-
quality LMX relationships, let alone intervening effects of
negative reciprocity motivated by low-quality LMX relationships.
This is problematic, as not differentiating between positive
and negative reciprocity confounds the potentially different
motives that employees may have to engage in different
unethical behaviors, especially different unethical behaviors
that serve to benefit different parties. In what follows, we
will contrast pro-leader with pro-self unethical behaviors
and argue how engaging in these distinct behaviors causes
employees to differentially satisfy either positive or negative
reciprocity motives.
Unethical Behavior as Means of Positive
and Negative Reciprocity
Unethical behavior is typically defined as any act that is “either
illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community” (Jones,
1991, p. 367). The majority of studies has focused on unethical
behavior that serves to benefit oneself (Umphress et al., 2010;
Umphress and Bingham, 2011). Recent research, however, has
demonstrated that individuals also engage in unethical behavior
to benefit others, including their organizations (Umphress et al.,
2010; Umphress and Bingham, 2011), groups (Thau et al., 2015),
and even leaders (Johnson and Umphress, 2018; Mesdaghinia
et al., 2018; Bryant and Merritt, 2019). Benefits, in these contexts,
are typically represented by the extent to which unethical
behavior allows one to more effectively or efficiently ensure
desirable outcomes (Schweitzer et al., 2004; Ordóñez et al., 2009;
Welsh and Ordóñez, 2014). Within this study, we distinguish
pro-leader and pro-self unethical behavior by defining them as
follower “actions that are intended to promote the effective
functioning of (the follower’s leader or the follower him-/herself)
and violate core societal values, mores, laws, or standards of
proper conduct” (cf. Umphress and Bingham, 2011, p. 622).
As is the case with similar constructs, it is important to stress
that benefits are intended, regardless of whether the beneficiary
actually benefits from the unethical behavior (Sackett, 2002;
Umphress et al., 2010).
Engaging in unethical behavior is typically associated with
various negative consequences and costs, including direct or
indirect punishment and damage to their reputation or moral
identity (Becker, 1968; Gino and Margolis, 2011; Mulder et al.,
2015). Accordingly, followers tend to be inhibited from engaging
in unethical behavior (Jordan and Monin, 2008) and need to
be released of these inhibitions before they can engage in them
(Treviño et al., 2014), both to benefit oneself (e.g., Vriend et al.,
2016) and others (e.g., Chen et al., 2016). Ethical inhibitions can
be released when the perceived benefits of unethical behavior
outweigh its perceived costs (Becker, 1968; Lewicki, 1983).
For pro-self unethical behavior, this is typically the case when
personal gains can be ensured (e.g., Brief et al., 2001; Gino
and Margolis, 2011) or when relationships can be maintained
(El Akremi et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013; Jawahar et al., 2018).
Within the broader tradition of unethical pro-organizational
behavior research, pro-leader unethical behavior benefits may
include the opportunity to satisfy needs for affiliation (Thau et al.,
2015), strengthen relational ties (Miao et al., 2013; Effelsberg
et al., 2014; Johnson and Umphress, 2018), or enact reciprocity
beliefs (Umphress et al., 2010; Bryant and Merritt, 2019;
Wang et al., 2019).
Positive Reciprocity Motives and Pro-leader
Unethical Behavior
We argue that pro-leader unethical behavior will be able to
satisfy the positive reciprocity motive instilled by high-quality
LMX relationships. High-quality LMX relationships create an
obligation for followers to positively reciprocate the benefit they
receive from their leaders by engaging in actions that benefit
their leaders in return (Gouldner, 1960; Uhl-Bien and Maslyn,
2003; Brandes and Franck, 2012). Followers that fulfill this
reciprocity motive by engaging in pro-leader unethical behavior
gain no direct benefit themselves. Instead, for the follower, the
prime functionality of the pro-leader unethical behavior is that
the benefit is directly bestowed upon their leader (Mesdaghinia
et al., 2018). Despite the lack of direct self-benefits accrued
through pro-leader unethical behavior, however, followers do risk
its consequences (cf. Becker, 1968; Gino and Margolis, 2011;
Mulder et al., 2015). This indicates that followers would be
willing to go through great lengths, at potentially great costs, to
benefit their leader.
Although followers may be inhibited to engage in pro-leader
unethical behavior (cf. Jordan and Monin, 2008; Chen et al.,
2016), previous research has established that strong relational
ties may release such ethical inhibitions (Umphress et al., 2010;
Umphress and Bingham, 2011; Miao et al., 2013; Thau et al., 2015;
Johnson and Umphress, 2018). High-quality LMX relationships
are characterized by mutual affect, loyalty, and liking (Liden and
Maslyn, 1998), which signal strong relational ties. Such strong
relational ties can encourage followers to resort to pro-leader
unethical behavior. They may, for example, exaggerate successes
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and lie about wrongdoings of their leader to others, intending to
benefit or protect the leader and maintain the high-quality LMX
relationship. Thus, as high-quality LMX relationships obligate
followers to positively reciprocate the benefits they receive
from their leader (Gouldner, 1960; Brandes and Franck, 2012),
pro-leader unethical behavior allows followers to satisfy this
obligation (cf. Umphress and Bingham, 2011).
Negative Reciprocity Motive and Pro-self Unethical
Behavior
We argue that pro-self unethical behavior satisfies the negative
reciprocity motive instilled by low-quality LMX relationships.
Low-quality LMX relationships are characterized as economic
exchange relationships, in which followers are expected to
adhere to the formal obligations, rules, standards, and norms
as stipulated in their work contract (Liden and Maslyn, 1998).
Similarly, leaders are expected to hold their followers accountable
for violations of these contract obligations (Treviño and Brown,
2005; Brown and Mitchell, 2010). Followers with a low-quality
LMX relationship are likely to feel deprived relative to peers
who have higher-quality LMX relationships (Henderson et al.,
2009), instilling a negative reciprocity motive in them (Uhl-
Bien and Maslyn, 2003; Eisenberger et al., 2004). When followers
engage in pro-self unethical behavior, they directly violate
the formal obligations, rules, standards, and norms that their
leaders are holding them accountable for. This signals that
followers’ gains obtained by their unethical behavior are more
important to them than adhering to the rules stipulated by
their leader. Pro-self unethical behavior therefore satisfies a
negative reciprocity motive by directly degrading and corrupting
the economic exchanges that they are expected to maintain
as stipulated by the formal work contract. Pro-self unethical
behavior can therefore be perceived as an effective means through
which followers can reciprocate the felt unfair treatment and
restore the balance in the relationship with their leader. Typical
examples of pro-self unethical behaviors driven by a negative
reciprocity motive in LMX relationships include both leader-
and organization-directed deviance (El Akremi et al., 2010; Liu
et al., 2013), counterproductive work behavior (Jawahar et al.,
2018), withdrawal behaviors (Gerstner and Day, 1997), and
illegitimate acts such as exaggerating one’s successes or illegally
appropriating resources.
STUDY 1
The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate whether LMX
indeed differentially relates to pro-leader and pro-self unethical
behaviors and whether these effects are indeed driven by positive
and negative reciprocity motives. More specifically, we conducted
an experimental study to assess, first, whether low-quality LMX
relationships motivate more pro-self than pro-leader unethical
intentions and whether high-quality LMX relationships motivate
more pro-leader than pro-self unethical intentions. Second, we
examined whether positive reciprocity motives explain why high-
quality LMX relationships are more likely to motivate pro-
leader than pro-self unethical intentions and negative reciprocity
motives explain why low-quality LMX relationships are more
likely to motivate pro-self than pro-leader unethical intentions.
Materials and Methods
Participants
One hundred and sixty-four United States residents
(Mage = 31.75, SDage = 11.10, 40.85% female) were recruited
through Mturk. We told participants that we were investigating
how personality influences decision-making. Participants were
provided with $0.50 for their participation.
Procedure
We randomly assigned participants to one of four experimental
conditions in a 2 (LMX: high vs. low) × 2 (type of unethical
behavior: pro-leader vs. pro-self) between-subjects design. We
first provided participants with either a high-LMX or a low-
LMX scenario (adapted from Bhal and Dadhich, 2011) (low LMX
between brackets in italics):
“You and your supervisor (do not) get along very well. You (do not)
like your supervisor as a person very much, and you (do not) like
working with your supervisor. The two of you just (do not) get along.
You have the feeling that your supervisor does not only treat (only
treats) you as an employee, but also (and not) as a unique person,
and that you can (not) go to your supervisor with personal wishes
and problems. Your relationship is based on mutual trust (your
formal work contract). Because your supervisor is (not) willing to
do something extra for you, you are also (not) willing to do more
than strictly necessary.”
Positive and negative reciprocity motives
After the LMX manipulation, we used a shortened (cf. Caliendo
et al., 2012; Egloff et al., 2013) version of Perugini et al.’s (2003)
measurement instrument to assess the extent (1 = fully disagree,
7 = fully agree) to which participants would have positive and
negative reciprocity motives in relationship to the supervisor
depicted in the scenario. Positive reciprocity motive (α = 0.86)
was assessed by the items: “If my supervisor does me a favor,
I am prepared to return it,” “I go out of my way to help my
supervisor who has been kind to me before,” and “I am ready
to undergo personal costs to help my supervisor who helped me
before.” Negative reciprocity motive (α = 0.85) was assessed by
the items: “If my supervisor causes me to suffer a serious wrong, I
will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost,” “If
my supervisor puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same
to my supervisor,” and “If my supervisor offends me, I will offend
my supervisor back.”
Pro-leader and pro-self unethical intentions
After inquiring about their reciprocity motives, depending on
their assigned condition, we asked participants to indicate either
the extent (1 = fully disagree, 7 = fully agree) to which they would
engage in pro-leader or pro-self unethical behavior. Pro-leader
unethical intention (α = 0.91) was assessed by the items: “If it
would help my supervisor, I would misrepresent the truth to
make my supervisor look good,” “If it would help my supervisor,
I would exaggerate the truth about my supervisor’s successes to
others,” and “If it would benefit my supervisor, I would withhold
negative information about my supervisor to others.” Pro-self
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unethical intention (α = 0.78) was assessed by the items: “If it
would help me, I would misrepresent the truth to make me look
good,” “If it would help me, I would exaggerate the truth about my
successes to others,” and “If it would benefit me, I would withhold
negative information about myself to others.” These items were
based on similar items developed by Umphress et al. (2010) and
Johnson and Umphress (2018)1.
We piloted these items for discriminant validity in a sample of
221 employed United States residents (Mage = 31.29, SDage = 9.85,
33.94% female) recruited through Mturk. An exploratory factor
analysis revealed two distinct pro-leader and pro-self unethical
intention factors that together explained 78.99% of the variance.
Pro-leader and pro-self unethical intentions were positively
correlated, r(220) = 0.42, p < 0.001, which is comparable to
correlations between similar constructs (e.g., the meta-analytic
correlation between interpersonal and organizational deviance,
ρ = 0.62, as reported by Berry et al., 2007). These results confirm
that intended pro-leader and pro-self unethical behaviors are
distinct and measurable constructs.
Manipulation check
To check our LMX manipulation, we used Liden and Maslyn’s
(1998) 11-item measurement instrument to assess how
participants perceived the quality of the relationship with
the supervisor as described in the scenario (1 = fully disagree,
7 = fully agree; α = 0.99). Example items include: “I like my
supervisor very much as a person,” “My supervisor would come
to my defense if I were ‘attacked’ by others,” and “I am willing to
apply extra efforts, beyond those formally required to further the
interests of my supervisor.”
Control variables
We controlled for gender and age. Substantive conclusions drawn
from the results are similar both with and without control
variables.
Results
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations are reported
in Table 1. The significant correlation between the LMX
manipulation and the LMX manipulation check, r(164) = 0.87,
p < 0.001, indicates that LMX was successfully manipulated.
The Effect of LMX on Unethical Intentions
A 2 (LMX: low vs. high) × 2 (type of unethical behavior: pro-
leader vs. pro-self) ANOVA on unethical intention revealed no
significant main effect of LMX, F(1, 160) = 0.79, ns, a significant
main effect of type of unethical behavior, F(1, 160) = 15.25,
p < 0.001, and a significant interaction effect, F(1, 160) = 59.83,
p < 0.001. Additional contrast analyses revealed that participants
in the high LMX condition had higher pro-leader (M = 3.57,
SD = 1.34) than pro-self (M = 2.77, SD = 1.48) unethical
intentions, t(160) = 2.66), p < 0.01, and that participants in the
low LMX condition had higher pro-self (M = 4.59, SD = 1.42)
1The questionnaire initially contained two sets of six items. However, we left
out three items across both sets because they referred to behaviors that were
not unambiguously unethical. Furthermore, these items deviated from established
unethical behavior scales (e.g., Umphress et al., 2010; Johnson and Umphress,
2018).
than pro-leader (M = 2.09, SD = 1.20) unethical intentions,
t(160) = 8.25, p < 0.001. These results are illustrated in Figure 1.
The Mediating Role of Reciprocity Motives
To assess the extent to which reciprocity motives mediate the
indirect relationship between LMX and unethical intention, we
conducted moderated-mediation regression path analyses using
lavaan 0.6-5 in R (Rosseel, 2012). Specifically, we followed Model
14 moderated-mediation procedures as described by Hayes
(2013), which allowed us to assess our theoretical rationale that
the effects of LMX on intended unethical behavior are driven by
positive and negative reciprocity motives, and that these motives
dictate what type of unethical intention is elicited. Standardized
results of the regression path analysis and conditional indirect
effects are reported in Table 2.
First, results indicate that our LMX manipulation has a
positive effect on positive reciprocity motive (β = 0.63, p < 0.001)
and a negative effect on negative reciprocity motive (β = 0.37,
p < 0.01), which supports our premise that the quality of
LMX relationship dictates reciprocity motives. Second, results
indicate that non-significant effect of positive reciprocity motive
on unethical intention (β = -0.03, ns) is moderated by the
type of unethical behavior (β = -0.34, p < 0.001), such that
positive reciprocity motive is positively related to pro-leader
unethical behavior (β = 0.30, p < 0.001) and negatively related
to pro-self unethical behavior (β = -0.37, p < 0.001). Third,
results indicate that negative reciprocity motive has a significant
effect on unethical intention (β = 0.24, p < 0.001) that is
conditional upon the type of unethical behavior (β = 0.24,
p < 0.001), such that negative reciprocity motive is unrelated
to pro-leader unethical behavior (β = 0.00, ns) and positively
related to pro-self unethical behavior (β = 0.48, p < 0.001).
Finally, conditional indirect effects indicate that high-quality
LMX relationships, through positive reciprocity motives, increase
pro-leader unethical intention (β = 0.19, p < 0.001) and decrease
pro-self unethical intention (β = −0.24, p < 0.001), and that low-
quality LMX relationships, through negative reciprocity motives,
do not affect pro-leader unethical behavior (β = −0.00, ns), but
do increase pro-self unethical intention (β = −0.18, p < 0.001).
Discussion
The results of Study 1 provide us with a first indication
that high-quality LMX relationships can motivate pro-leader
unethical behavior to satisfy positive reciprocity motives and that
low-quality LMX relationships can motivate pro-self unethical
behavior to satisfy negative reciprocity motives. Despite its
merits, however, Study 1 has several limitations that prevent
us from drawing too strong conclusions with respect to our
expected relationships. First, although previous research has also
manipulated LMX by means of scenarios (Bhal and Dadhich,
2011), actual LMX relationships develop over a longer period
of time (Liden and Graen, 1980; Dienesch and Liden, 1986;
Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995), which is something that is difficult to
capture through experimental manipulations. Second, although
our diverse sample allows us to generalize across a multitude
of occupations, organizations, and industries, it does not allow
us to generalize across nationalities. Research has demonstrated
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations (Study 1).
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 1.41 0.49 –
2. Age (years) 31.75 11.10 0.18* –
3. Leader–member exchange manipulation (0 = low, 1 = high) 0.51 0.50 −0.10 −0.01 –
4. Unethical behavior manipulation (0 = pro-leader, 1 = pro-self) 0.49 0.50 0.05 −0.12 −0.05 –
5. Leader–member exchange manipulation check 4.06 2.17 −0.08 0.05 0.87*** 0.00 (0.99)
6. Positive reciprocity motive 4.56 1.76 −0.03 0.03 0.63*** 0.08 0.74*** (0.86)
7. Negative reciprocity motive 3.32 1.61 −0.17* −0.27*** −0.35*** 0.03 −0.42*** −0.36*** (0.85)
8. Unethical intention 3.29 1.64 −0.14 −0.11 −0.06 0.26*** −0.06 −0.07 0.28*** (0.85)
N = 164. Cronbach’s alphas between parentheses on the diagonal. *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
FIGURE 1 | Effect of LMX on unethical intentions (Study 1).
that the effects of LMX may be culturally dependent, especially
when aspects of ethics and fairness are concerned (Rockstuhl
et al., 2012). Similarly, national culture also has a substantial
influence on ethical decision-making (Westerman et al., 2007).
Accordingly, taken together, it would be useful to assess
our expected relationships in a different (national) context
where the quality of the LMX relationship has been able to
mature over time.
STUDY 2
The purpose of Study 2 was to replicate the mediating
mechanisms of Study 1 in a different cultural setting using a time-
split field study among followers that have actually been able to
develop an LMX relationship with their leaders over time.
Materials and Methods
Sample and Procedure
We collected three-wave time-split data from followers from
different companies from various industries in the Netherlands,
including construction, education, healthcare, local government,
and retail, among others. We invited 480 followers to participate
in our study for Wave 1. A total of 366 followers (76.25%)
completed the first questionnaire. Two months after inviting
them to participate in the first wave, we invited these 366
followers to participate in Wave 2. A total of 330 followers
(90.16%) completed the second questionnaire. Four months
after inviting them to participate in the second wave, we
invited these followers to participate in Wave 3. A total of 269
followers (81.52%) completed the third questionnaire. Of these
269 followers, 120 were male and 149 female, with an average age
of 43.77 years (SD = 11.74, range = 17–65) and organizational
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TABLE 2 | Standardized coefficients for regression path analysis and conditional indirect effects (Study 1).
Variable Positive reciprocity motive Negative reciprocity motive Unethical intention
Regression path analysis
Gender 0.03 (0.06) −0.16* (0.07) −0.12 (0.07)
Age 0.04 (0.06) −0.24*** (0.07) −0.06 (0.07)
Leader–member exchange (manipulation) 0.63*** (0.06) −0.37*** (0.07) 0.09 (0.08)
Type of unethical behavior (manipulation) 0.26*** (0.06)
Positive reciprocity motives −0.03 (0.08)
Negative reciprocity motives 0.24*** (0.07)
Type of unethical behavior (manipulation) × Positive reciprocity motives −0.34*** (0.07)
Type of unethical behavior (manipulation) × Negative reciprocity motives 0.24*** (0.07)
R2 0.40 0.22 0.37
Conditional indirect effects
Leader–member exchange (manipulation) –> Positive reciprocity motive > Unethical intention (pro-leader) 0.19** (0.07)
Leader–member exchange (manipulation) –> Positive reciprocity motive > Unethical intention (pro-self) −0.24*** (0.07)
Leader–member exchange (manipulation) –> Negative reciprocity motive > Unethical intention (pro-leader) −0.00 (0.04)
Leader–member exchange (manipulation) –> Negative reciprocity motive > Unethical intention (pro-self) −0.18*** (0.05)
N = 164. Standard errors between parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
tenure of 11.47 years (SD = 9.59, range = 0–39). Most followers
held a lower (99) or higher (110) vocational degree.
Measures
We measured all scales on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). As the questionnaires
were in Dutch, we translated the scales from English to Dutch
using a back-translation procedure (Brislin, 1970).
LMX
We assessed LMX (α = 0.87) in the first wave by means of the 11
items developed by Liden and Maslyn (1998) described earlier.
Positive and negative reciprocity motives
We assessed positive (α = 0.79) and negative (α = 0.88) reciprocity
motives in the second wave by means of the items developed by
Perugini et al. (2003) described earlier.
Pro-leader and pro-self unethical intentions
We assessed intended pro-leader (α = 0.76) and pro-self (α = 0.81)
unethical behavior in the third wave by means of the items used
previously.
Control variables
We controlled for gender, age, tenure with organization, tenure
with leader, and number of hours weekly worked under contract.
Substantive conclusions drawn from the results are similar both
with and without control variables.
Convergent and Divergent Validity and Common
Method Bias Considerations
We used lavaan 0.6-5 in R (Rosseel, 2012) to assess the convergent
and discriminant validities for the suggested measurement
model, to compare this with various alternative measurement
models, and to assess the extent of the common method bias. We
first estimated a baseline measurement model in which all items
loaded freely on their focal and designated construct without any
cross-loadings. This baseline measurement model provided an
unacceptable fit to the data [χ2(220) = 770.66, RMSEA = 0.10
[0.09–0.10], CFI = 0.82, TLI = 0.79] but was superior to
models in which we collapsed LMX and positive reciprocity,
1χ(4) = 247.20, p < 0.001, LMX and negative reciprocity
1χ(4) = 444.39, p < 0.001, positive and negative reciprocity,
1χ(4) = 449.08, p < 0.001, and pro-leader and pro-self unethical
intentions, 1χ(4) = 144.26, p < 0.001. We then estimated a
model in which we included an uncorrelated methods factor (cf.
Podsakoff et al., 1990). Adding this uncorrelated methods factor
significantly improved the model fit over our baseline model,
1χ(20) = 241.86, p < 0.001, indicating that common method
variance is present. Squaring the standardized factor loadings of
the items with the uncorrelated common method factor indicated
that 5.24% of the variance can be attributed to a common method.
We then followed the procedures outlined by Williams and
McGonagle (2016) to assess the degree of common method
variance present in our study and the extent of its effects on
(interrelations between) substantive variables. First, we compared
the common methods factor model with a common methods
factor model in which the substantive factor intercorrelations
were constrained to be equal to those of the baseline model.
The fit between the restricted and unrestricted models was
not significantly different, 1χ(10) = 0.46, ns, indicating that
the presence of common method variance does not influence
the interrelationships between the substantive factors. Second,
we calculated the substantive and method reliability for all
five substantive factors. Results demonstrate that LMX, positive
and negative reciprocity, and pro-leader and pro-self unethical
intentions have acceptable substantive reliabilities (0.82, 0.79,
0.89, 0.80, 0.81) and relatively low method reliabilities (0.07,
0.00, 0.00, 0.01, 0.00), indicating that the presence of common
method variance does not influence the substantive meaning of
the substantive factors.
Finally, we explored potential sources of the unacceptable
fit of the baseline model. Supplementary analyses revealed that
removing the 11 LMX items from the baseline model resulted in
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a good fit to the data [χ2(48) = 158.16, RMSEA = 0.09 [0.08–0.11],
CFI = 0.93, TLI = 0.91], substantially improving the model fit
relative to the baseline model (1CFI = 0.11, 1TLI = 0.12). This
indicates that our measurement instrument for LMX, which is
multidimensional in nature (Liden and Maslyn, 1998), may be the
primary culprit for the poor fit of our baseline model. To verify
this, we employed the internal-consistency approach to parceling
(Kishton and Widaman, 1994; Little et al., 2002). A model in
which we parceled the 11 LMX items into four parcels based
on their underlying dimensions, affect, contribution, loyalty,
and professional respect also resulted in a good fit to the
data [χ2(94) = 238.48, RMSEA = 0.08 [0.06–0.09], CFI = 0.92,
TLI = 0.90], substantially improving the model fit relative to
the baseline model (1CFI = 0.11, 1TLI = 0.12). Although
these results may imply that the measurement instrument for
LMX may suffer from poor reliability in our sample, this
should have limited consequences for our statistical analyses (cf.
Little et al., 2002).
Results
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations are reported in
Table 3.
To assess the mediating role of positive and negative
reciprocity motives, we conducted mediation regression path
analyses using lavaan 0.6-5 in R (Rosseel, 2012). Specifically,
we (1) regressed positive and negative reciprocity motives on
LMX and the control variables and (2) regressed pro-leader and
pro-self unethical intentions on positive and negative reciprocity
motives, LMX, and the control variables. Standardized results of
the regression path analysis and conditional indirect effects are
reported in Table 4.
First, the results indicate that LMX has a positive effect on
positive reciprocity motive (β = 0.16, p < 0.01) and a negative
effect on negative reciprocity motive (β = -0.16, p < 0.01).
Second, the results indicate that positive reciprocity motive has
a positive effect on both pro-leader (β = 0.23, p < 0.001) and
pro-self (β = 0.12, p < 0.05) unethical intentions. Third, the
results indicate that negative reciprocity motive has no significant
effect on pro-leader unethical intention (β = 0.05, ns), but does
have a significant positive effect on pro-self unethical intention
(β = 0.20, p < 0.01). Finally, conditional indirect effects indicate
that the relationship between LMX and pro-leader unethical
intention is primarily driven by positive reciprocity motives
(β = 0.04, p < 0.05) and not negative reciprocity motives (β = -
0.01, ns), and that the relationship between LMX and pro-self
unethical intention is primarily driven by negative reciprocity
motives (β = -0.03, p < 0.05) and not positive reciprocity motives
(β = 0.02, ns).
Discussion
The results of Study 2 provide further support for our premise
that both high- and low-quality LMX relationships can motivate
followers to engage in unethical behavior, albeit for different
reasons. More specifically, followers with a high-quality LMX
relationship are motivated to engage in pro-leader unethical
behavior to satisfy negative reciprocity motives, and followers
with a low-quality LMX relationship are motivated to engage in
pro-self unethical behavior to satisfy negative reciprocity motives.
In contrast to Study 1, however, we did not find a significant
indirect relationship from LMX to pro-self unethical intention
that is mediated by positive reciprocity motive.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this investigation, we took a social exchange perspective to
identify when, why, and how leaders may unintendedly motivate
followers to consider unethical behavior that either serves the
leader or the self. Across two studies, we find compelling
empirical evidence to support our expectation that high-quality
LMX relationships motivate pro-leader unethical intention to
satisfy positive reciprocity motives and that low-quality LMX
relationships motivate pro-self unethical intention to satisfy
negative reciprocity motives. The diverse nature of the studies
allows us to generalize these findings across a wide variety
of occupations, organizations, industries, and even cultures.
Furthermore, our experimental setup in Study 1 and the time-
split nature of Study 2 provide further credence to the causal
direction of our expected effects.
In addition to the expected effects, there was an unexpected
and inconsistent cross-effect of reciprocity on intended unethical
behavior across the studies. Specifically, while we found in
Study 1 that positive reciprocity motive is negatively related
to intended pro-self unethical behavior, in Study 2, we found
that this relationship is positive. These inconsistent cross-effects
of positive reciprocity motive may be evidence for a cultural
dependency effect of LMX (Rockstuhl et al., 2012) and ethical
decision-making (Westerman et al., 2007). On a more general
level, however, this could indicate that there is more to the
relationship between reciprocity motive and unethical behavior
than we envisioned. The unexpected positive cross-effect of
positive reciprocity on intended pro-self unethical behavior in
Study 1, for example, could indicate that a positive reciprocity
motive (i.e., doing good) may license followers to engage in
intended unethical behavior for their own benefit (i.e., doing bad)
(cf. Sachdeva et al., 2009). The unexpected negative cross-effect
of positive reciprocity on intended pro-self unethical behavior
in Study 2, on the other hand, could, for example, indicate
that followers may not only be concerned with reciprocating
established exchange relationships (i.e., paying back), but also
be concerned with developing future exchange relationships over
time (i.e., paying forward) (Korsgaard et al., 2010).
Theoretical Implications
Our theoretical and empirical findings have implications for
various streams of literature, particularly on social exchange
theory (e.g., Gouldner, 1960; Blau, 1964), LMX (e.g., Dienesch
and Liden, 1986; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Settoon et al.,
1996), and (self- and other-serving) unethical behavior (e.g.,
Umphress et al., 2010; Treviño et al., 2014; Bryant and Merritt,
2019). First, our findings have implications for the notion
that leaders, as gatekeepers of appropriate conduct, are tasked
with preventing self-interested unethical behavior among their
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TABLE 3 | Descriptive statistics and first-order intercorrelations (Study 2).
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.55 0.50 –
2. Age (years) 43.77 11.74 −0.04 –
3. Tenure with organization (years) 11.47 9.59 −0.08 0.59*** –
4. Tenure with leader (years) 4.35 5.30 −0.19** 0.20** 0.33*** –
5. Number of contractual hours (per week) 30.84 8.92 −0.56*** 0.11 0.07 0.12 –
6. Leader–member exchange 3.90 0.55 0.05 −0.09 −0.07 0.01 0.03 (0.87)
7. Positive reciprocity motive 3.14 0.86 0.00 −0.23*** −0.16** −0.01 −0.07 0.18** (0.79)
8. Negative reciprocity motive 1.59 0.71 −0.23*** 0.03 0.14* 0.09 0.21*** −0.16** 0.17** (0.88)
9. Pro-leader unethical intention 2.78 0.89 −0.14* −0.11 −0.11 0.01 0.14* 0.12 0.26*** 0.11 (0.76)
10. Pro-self unethical intention 2.45 0.87 −0.19** −0.08 −0.10 −0.01 0.17** −0.02 0.16** 0.24*** 0.61*** (0.81)
N = 269. Cronbach’s alphas between parentheses on the diagonal. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.










Gender −0.06 (0.07) −0.14 (0.07) −0.08 (0.07) −0.11 (0.07)
Age (years) −0.18* (0.07) −0.10 (0.07) −0.02 (0.07) −0.01 (0.07)
Tenure with organization (years) −0.06 (0.08) 0.15* (0.07) −0.08 (0.07) −0.11 (0.07)
Tenure with leader (years) 0.04 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06) −0.02 (0.06)
Number of contractual hours (per week) −0.09 (0.07) 0.13 (0.07) 0.10 (0.07) 0.08 (0.07)
Leader–member exchange 0.16** (0.06) −0.16** (0.06) 0.08 (0.06) −0.01 (0.06)
Positive reciprocity motive 0.23*** (0.06) 0.12* (0.06)
Negative reciprocity motive 0.05 (0.06) 0.20** (0.06)
R2 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10
Indirect effects
Leader–member exchange –> Positive reciprocity motive > Pro-leader unethical intention 0.04* (0.02)
Leader–member exchange –> Positive reciprocity motive > Pro-Self unethical intention 0.02 (0.01)
Leader–member exchange –> Negative reciprocity motive > Pro-leader unethical intention −0.01 (0.01
Leader–member exchange –> Negative reciprocity motive > Pro-self unethical intention −0.03* (0.01)
N = 269. Standard errors between parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
followers (Treviño and Brown, 2005; Brown and Treviño, 2006;
Kalshoven et al., 2016). Indeed, although empirical evidence
is scarce (Martin et al., 2016), research has predominantly
suggested that leaders can prevent undesirable behaviors among
their followers by forming high-quality LMX relationships with
them (El Akremi et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013; Jawahar et al.,
2018). The central idea behind this preventive perspective is that
high-quality LMX relationships obligate followers to positively
reciprocate this relationship by reducing unethical behavior.
Although the negative effect of positive reciprocity on pro-
self unethical behavior in Study 1 certainly speaks to this
idea, results of Study 2 demonstrate that positive reciprocity is
positively associated with intended pro-self unethical behavior,
suggesting moral licensing effects (cf. Sachdeva et al., 2009).
Overall, therefore, our results imply that forming high-quality
LMX relationships does not necessarily lead to a felt obligation
among followers to reduce their pro-self unethical behavior.
Second, our findings have implications for the role of negative
reciprocity in LMX relationships. Like positive reciprocity,
negative reciprocity is part of the social exchange mechanisms
that followers have at their disposal (Gouldner, 1960; Blau, 1964;
Eisenberger et al., 2004). Although negative reciprocity is part
of the LMX framework, it is not regularly used as such (Uhl-
Bien and Maslyn, 2003). Instead, as mentioned earlier, research
on LMX typically relies on the positive reciprocity route to
argue for relationships with undesirable behavior (El Akremi
et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013; Jawahar et al., 2018). Moreover,
although researchers have linked unethical behavior to positive
reciprocity dispositions (Umphress et al., 2010; Bryant and
Merritt, 2019), we know of no research that has considered
the indirect effects of LMX on unethical behavior through
positive reciprocity motives, not to mention negative reciprocity
motives. This is an important shortcoming, given that leaders
have limited resources to establish high-quality relationships
with all their followers (Liden and Graen, 1980; Graen and
Uhl-Bien, 1995; Henderson et al., 2009), meaning that negative
reciprocity is very likely to result. Furthermore, our findings
clearly indicate that negative reciprocity plays a crucial role in the
relationship between LMX and unethical intentions. Specifically,
developing low-quality LMX relationships may make followers
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feel sufficiently deprived that they have a need to negatively
reciprocate this deprivation, which they can do by engaging in
pro-self unethical behavior. Following up on our first theoretical
implication, given that both high-quality (through positive
reciprocity) and low-quality (through negative reciprocity) LMX
relationships may elicit pro-self unethical behavior, forming LMX
relations may not be useful for leaders to regulate follower
unethical behavior.
Finally, our findings have implications for the further
conceptualization of pro-leader relative to pro-self unethical
behavior and how LMX relationships motivate it. Previous
research has established that followers engage in pro-leader
unethical behavior because they identify with their leader
(Johnson and Umphress, 2018) and as a response to leader
bottom-line mentality (Mesdaghinia et al., 2018). We add to
this literature by consistently demonstrating that the high-
quality LMX relationships that leaders develop with followers
spark a necessity to positively reciprocate this relationship,
which followers can do by engaging in pro-leader unethical
behavior. Although previous studies have suggested that
reciprocity considerations moderate the relationship between
LMX and unethical behavior (e.g., Umphress et al., 2010;
Bryant and Merritt, 2019), our social exchange theory embedded
experimental approach demonstrates that positive and negative
reciprocity mediate this relationship. These results not only
indicate that pro-other unethical behavior is distinct from pro-
self unethical behavior, as is frequently implied (e.g., Umphress
et al., 2010; Umphress and Bingham, 2011; Johnson and
Umphress, 2018), but also demonstrate that they operate through
distinct mechanisms.
Practical Implications
Our findings have meaningful implications for the promotion
and prevention of unethical behavior through LMX relationships.
Given its copious beneficial effects (Ilies et al., 2007; Dulebohn
et al., 2012; Martin et al., 2016), differentiating among followers
has become common managerial practice (Henderson et al.,
2009). While we do not dispute that LMX relationships
can be extremely useful and beneficial to management, our
findings do suggest that LMX relationships may also have
some qualities that limit their usefulness. Provided that both
low- and high-quality LMX relationships motivate unethical
behavior, albeit for different reasons, leaders are effectively
motivating their followers to engage in unethical behavior
through the LMX relationships that they establish – regardless
of their quality. This Catch-22, where the beneficial effects
of a management tool are associated with various harmful
effects, is not unique to LMX relationships (e.g., goal-setting,
Schweitzer et al., 2004; Ordóñez et al., 2009). One way
of off-setting this perverse cycle, as previous research has
suggested, is to employ followers high on moral identity
(Aquino and Reed, 2002; Johnson and Umphress, 2018;
Mesdaghinia et al., 2018), as this tends to reduce the
effects of motivating mechanisms on unethical behavior.
Given that moral identity is difficult to establish, however,
it may be more efficient for a leader to emphasize moral
awareness (Jordan, 2009). If leaders are able to create a
moral awareness among their followers, they can reduce
their intended unethical behaviors (Barsky, 2008). Leaders
can potentially do so by employing an ethical leadership
style that demotivates unethical conduct (Brown and Mitchell,
2010; Treviño et al., 2014). An alternative route for leaders
to reduce unethical behavior is by increasing the likelihood
and severity of punishment. If followers perceive that the
punishment of unethical behavior outweighs its benefit or find
that the behavior is not functional to satisfy their positive and
negative reciprocity motives, their ethical inhibitions may be
maintained (Chen et al., 2016; Vriend et al., 2016), causing
them to refrain from engaging in such behavior (Becker, 1968;
Mulder et al., 2015).
Limitations and Future Research
Directions
While our investigation has several strengths, it also has several
limitations. Despite employing an experimental setup in a
US sample and a time-lagged design in a Dutch context,
there are several methodological and empirical limitations
of note. First, both LMX and ethical decision-making are
prone to cultural biases (Westerman et al., 2007; Rockstuhl
et al., 2012). Although we found consistent evidence for
our expectations in countries representing the Anglo and
Nordic clusters (Ronen and Shenkar, 2013), the shape of our
expected relationships may be different for other clusters. It
seems feasible, for example, that collectivistic cultures are less
open to negative reciprocity motives and self-serving unethical
behavior than individualistic cultures, which may make the
positive reciprocity and other-serving unethical behavior path
more salient in these cultures. Second, similarly, our studies
included followers from a wide range of organizations and
industries. Although this attests to the external validity of
our samples, it does not rule out that the shape of our
expected relationships may be different for specific types of
organizations or industries. Third, we used a single source,
namely the follower, to gauge our focal variables. This implies that
common method variance may bias (inflate) the relationships
found across our studies. Given our experimental and time-
split designs and that we found no evidence that the relatively
small fraction of common method variance in Study 2 (5.24%)
influenced the interrelationships and reliabilities of our focal
variables, however, we do not think that common method
variance is an issue.
Another methodological and empirical limitation of note
is that we relied on self-report of unethical intentions, rather
than other-reports of unethical behavior. Our argumentation to
justify this is threefold. First, a follower’s unethical intentions
are a cognitive representation that leaders are unable to
tap into (cf. Janssen, 2000). Second, unethical acts violate
important norms and can, in some cases, even be illegal. This
means that followers are unlikely to reveal their unethical
acts to others (Treviño and Brown, 2005), implying that it
is difficult for leaders to assess the unethical intentions and
behavior of their followers. Third, the average correlation
between intention and behavior is relatively high (r = 0.47, as
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reported in a meta-analysis by Armitage and Conner, 2001);
although unethical intentions do not perfectly capture unethical
behavior, they should be a very strong predictor of it. Taken
together, for the purpose of our study, we believe that measuring
unethical intention is more appropriate than behavior and that
this unethical intention sufficiently captures unethical behavior.
Both a conceptual and methodological limitation lies in
the fact that LMX is a dynamic construct that continually
changes (role theory; Graen, 1976) as a result of (reciprocal)
interactions between leaders and followers (social exchange
theory; Gouldner, 1960; Blau, 1964). This implies that LMX may
be an endogenous construct (Antonakis et al., 2014) in which
it is unclear whether LMX would have a causal effect on (pro-
leader and pro-self) unethical behavior through (positive and
negative) reciprocity, as we suggest, or whether this unethical
behavior shapes the quality of the LMX relationship. This is
further complicated by the fact that we rely on the argument
that followers employ this unethical behavior to satisfy their
reciprocity motive, likely intending to influence the quality
of their LMX relationship. Although we have tried to relieve
this limitation by employing an experimental setup in the
first study and a time-split design in the field study in which
participants were asked about their current LMX and their
intended reciprocity motive and unethical behavior, this does not
completely rule out alternative causal models.
A final conceptual limitation lies in our argumentation for
the mediating role of negative reciprocity. We assume that
negative reciprocity is caused by the fact that those in low-
quality LMX relationships will feel deprived relative to those in
high-quality LMX relationships. While there is ample evidence
for this argument from an LMX differentiation perspective
(Henderson et al., 2009), we do not empirically employ such a
perspective, as we do not compare the LMX relationships between
followers from the same leader. Furthermore, it could well be
that followers have no need to establish social exchanges with
their leaders and are relatively comfortable with relationships
solely based on economic exchanges. In such cases, followers
would not feel deprived, would not feel their economic exchange
as a slight, and would have no need to engage in pro-self
unethical behavior as a means of negative reciprocation. Hence,
the preference of favoring a simple contract-based economic
exchange relationship or wanting a higher-quality relationship
could serve as an important moderator of the effects that we have
explored throughout our studies.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and practitioners have long assumed that leaders
can prevent unethical behavior among their followers by
establishing high-quality LMX relationships with them, which
has become a popular means for leaders to manage their
followers. Recent findings and the current investigation, however,
have suggested and demonstrate that the story may be more
nuanced, such that both low- and high-quality LMX relationships
may motivate unethical behavior. Followers either engage in
pro-leader unethical behavior to positively reciprocate high-
quality relationships or pro-self unethical behavior to negatively
reciprocate low-quality relationships. Regardless of their quality,
therefore, LMX relationships motivate unethical behavior among
followers. The only influence that the quality has, then, is who
this unethical behavior is intended to benefit. In light of both its
beneficial and harmful effects, theorists and practitioners should
be wary of the effects of the LMX relationships: the dark side of
relational leadership.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The datasets generated for this study are available on request to
the corresponding author.
ETHICS STATEMENT
All procedures performed in the studies were in accordance
with ethical standards. All participants were informed about
study procedures and voluntarily consented to participate.
Study 1 was approved by the institutional research committee
(University of Groningen Faculty of Economics and Business
Ethical Committee, reference number #2013_52). The
patients/participants provided their written informed consent
to participate in this study.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
TV and RS were involved in all steps of the research process. OJ
and JJ contributed to the writing of the manuscript. All authors
contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.
REFERENCES
Antonakis, J., Bendahan, S., Jacquart, P., and Lalive, R. (2014). “Causality
and endogeneity: problems and solutions,” in The Oxford Handbook
of Leadership and Organizations, ed. D. V. Day (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 93–117. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199755615.
013.007
Aquino, K., and Reed, A. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 83, 1423–1440. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.
1423
Armitage, C. J., and Conner, M. (2001). Efficacy of the theory of planned
behaviour: a meta-analytic review. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 471–499. doi: 10.1348/
014466601164939
Barsky, A. (2008). Understanding the ethical cost of organizational goal-setting: a
review and theory development. J. Bus. Ethics 81, 63–81. doi: 10.1007/s10551-
007-9481-6
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J. Polit. Econ.
76, 169–217. doi: 10.1086/259394
Berry, C. M., Ones, D. S., and Sackett, P. R. (2007). Interpersonal deviance,
organizational deviance, and their common correlates: a review and
meta-analysis. J. Appl. Psychol. 92, 410–424. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.92.
2.410
Bhal, K. T., and Dadhich, A. (2011). Impact of ethical leadership and leader-
member exchange on whistle blowing: the moderating impact of the moral
intensity of the issue. J. Bus. Ethics 103, 485–496. doi: 10.1007/s10551-011-
0876-z
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 July 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 1473
fpsyg-11-01473 July 9, 2020 Time: 17:1 # 12
Vriend et al. LMX, Reciprocity, and Intended Unethical Behavior
Blau, P. (1964). Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York, NY: Wiley, Inc.
Brandes, L., and Franck, E. (2012). Social preferences or personal career concerns?
Field evidence on positive and negative reciprocity in the workplace. J. Econ.
Psychol. 33, 925–939. doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.05.001
Brief, A. P., Buttram, R. T., and Dukerick, J. M. (2001). “Collective corruption in
the corporate world: toward a process model,” in Groups at Work: Theory and
Research. Applied Social Research, ed. M. E. Turner (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc), 471–499.
Brislin, R. W. (1970). Back-translation for cross-cultural research. J. Cross Cult.
Psychol. 1, 185–216. doi: 10.1177/135910457000100301
Brown, M. E., and Mitchell, M. S. (2010). Ethical and unethical leadership:
exploring new avenues for future research. Bus. Ethics Q. 4, 583–616. doi:
10.5840/beq201020439
Brown, M. E., and Treviño, L. K. (2006). Ethical leadership: a review and future
directions. Leadersh. Q. 17, 595–616. doi: 10.1016/j.leaqua.2006.10.004
Bryant, W., and Merritt, S. M. (2019). Unethical pro-organizational behavior and
positive leader–employee relationships. J. Bus. Ethics. doi: 10.1007/s10551-019-
04211-x
Caliendo, M., Fossen, F., and Kritikos, A. (2012). Trust, positive reciprocity, and
negative reciprocity: Do these traits impact entrepreneurial dynamics? J. Econ.
Psychol. 33, 394–409. doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.01.005
Chen, M., Chen, C. C., and Sheldon, O. J. (2016). Relaxing moral reasoning to
win: How organizational identification relates to unethical pro-organizational
behavior. J. Appl. Psychol. 101, 1082–1096. doi: 10.1037/apl0000111
Dienesch, R. M., and Liden, R. C. (1986). Leader-member exchange model of
leadership: a critique and further development. Acad. Manage. Rev. 11, 618–
634. doi: 10.5465/amr.1986.4306242
Dulebohn, J. H., Bommer, W. H., Liden, R. C., Brouer, R. L., and Ferris, G. R.
(2012). A meta-analysis of antecedents and consequences of leader-member
exchange: integrating the past with an eye toward the future. J. Manage. 38,
1715–1759. doi: 10.1177/0149206311415280
Effelsberg, D., and Solga, M. (2015). Transformational leaders’ in-group versus
out-group orientation: testing the link between leaders’ organizational
identification, their willingness to engage in unethical pro-organizational
behavior, and follower-perceived transformational leadership. J. Bus. Ethics 126,
581–590. doi: 10.1007/s10551-013-1972-z
Effelsberg, D., Solga, M., and Gurt, J. (2014). Transformational leadership and
follower’s unethical behavior for the benefit of the company: a two-study
investigation. J. Bus. Ethics 120, 81–93. doi: 10.1007/s10551-013-1644-z
Egloff, B., Richter, D., and Schmukle, S. C. (2013). Need for conclusive evidence
that positive and negative reciprocity are unrelated. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
110, E786–E786. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1221451110
Eisenberger, R., Lynch, P., Aselage, J., and Rohdieck, S. (2004). Who takes the most
revenge? Individual differences in negative reciprocity norm endorsement. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. Bull. 30, 787–799. doi: 10.1177/0146167204264047
El Akremi, A., Vandenberghe, C., and Camerman, J. (2010). The role of justice and
social exchange relationships in workplace deviance: test of a mediated model.
Hum. Relat. 63, 1687–1717. doi: 10.1177/0018726710364163
Engle, E. M., and Lord, R. G. (1997). Implicit theories, self-schemas, and leader-
member exchange. Acad. Manage. J. 40, 988–1010. doi: 10.5465/256956
Folger, R., and Martin, C. (1986). Relative deprivation and referent cognitions:
distributive and procedural justice effects. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 22, 531–546.
doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(86)90049-1
Gerstner, C. R., and Day, D. V. (1997). Meta-analytic review of leader-member
exchange theory: correlates and construct issues. J. Appl. Psychol. 82, 827–844.
doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.82.6.827
Giacalone, R. A., and Promislo, M. D. (2010). Unethical and unwell: decrements
in well-being and unethical activity at work. J. Bus. Ethics 91, 275–297. doi:
10.1007/s10551-009-0083-3
Gino, F., and Margolis, J. D. (2011). Bringing ethics into focus: how regulatory
focus and risk preferences influence (un)ethical behavior. Organ. Behav. Hum.
Decis. Process. 115, 145–156. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.01.006
Gottfredson, R. K., Wright, S. L., and Heaphy, E. D. (2020). A critique of the leader-
member exchange construct: back to square one. Leadersh. Q. 2018:101385.
doi: 10.1016/j.leaqua.2020.101385
Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: a preliminary statement. Am.
Sociol. Rev. 25, 161–178. doi: 10.2307/2092623
Graen, G. B. (1976). “Role making processes within complex organizations,” in
Handbook in Industrial and Organizational Psychology, ed. M. D. Dunnette
(Chicago, IL: Rand Mcnally), 1201–1245.
Graen, G. B., and Uhl-Bien, M. (1995). Relationship-based approach to leadership:
Development of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory of leadership over 25
years: applying a multi-level multi-domain perspective. Leadersh. Q. 6, 219–247.
doi: 10.1016/1048-9843(95)90036-5
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional
Process Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach. New York, NY: Guilford
Publications.
Henderson, D. J., Liden, R. C., Glibkowski, B. C., and Chaudhry, A. (2009). LMX
differentiation: a multilevel review and examination of its antecedents and
outcomes. Leadersh. Q. 20, 517–534. doi: 10.1016/j.leaqua.2009.04.003
Ilies, R., Nahrgang, J. D., and Morgeson, F. P. (2007). Leader-member exchange
and citizenship behaviors: a meta-analysis. J. Appl. Psychol. 92, 269–277. doi:
10.1037/0021-9010.92.1.269
Janssen, O. (2000). Job demands, perceptions of effort–reward fairness and
innovative work behaviour. J. Occup. Organ. Psychol. 73, 287–302. doi: 10.1348/
096317900167038
Jawahar, I. M., Schreurs, B., and Mohammed, S. J. (2018). How and when LMX
quality relates to counterproductive performance: a mediated moderation
model. Career Dev. Int. 23, 557–575. doi: 10.1108/cdi-05-2018-0134
Johnson, H. H., and Umphress, E. E. (2018). To help my supervisor: identification,
moral identity, and unethical pro-supervisor behavior. J. Bus. Ethics 159, 519–
534. doi: 10.1007/s10551-018-3836-z
Jones, T. M. (1991). Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: an
issue-contingent model. Acad. Manage. Rev. 16, 366–395. doi: 10.5465/AMR.
1991.4278958
Jordan, A. H., and Monin, B. (2008). From sucker to saint: moralization in
response to self-threat. Psychol. Sci. 19, 809–815. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.
02161.x
Jordan, J. (2009). A social cognition framework for examining moral awareness in
managers and academics. J. Bus. Ethics 84, 237–258. doi: 10.1007/s10551-008-
9706-3
Kalshoven, K., van Dijk, H., and Boon, C. (2016). Why and when does ethical
leadership evoke unethical follower behavior? J. Manag. Psychol. 31, 500–515.
doi: 10.1108/JMP-10-2014-0314
Kishton, J. M., and Widaman, K. F. (1994). Unidimensional versus domain
representative parceling of questionnaire items: an empirical example. Educ.
Psychol. Meas. 54, 757–765. doi: 10.1177/0013164494054003022
Kong, D. T. (2016). The pathway to unethical pro-organizational behavior:
organizational identification as a joint function of work passion and
trait mindfulness. Pers. Individ. Differ. 93, 86–91. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2015.
08.035
Korsgaard, M. A., Meglino, B. M., Lester, S. W., and Jeong, S. S. (2010). Paying
you back or paying me forward: understanding rewarded and unrewarded
organizational citizenship behavior. J. Appl. Psychol. 95, 277–290. doi: 10.1037/
a0018137
Lee, A., Schwarz, G., Newman, A., and Legood, A. (2019). Investigating when and
why psychological entitlement predicts unethical pro-organizational behavior.
J. Bus. Ethics 154, 109–126. doi: 10.1007/s10551-017-3456-z
Lewicki, J. R. (1983). “Lying and deception: a behavioral model,” in Negotiating in
Organizations, eds M. H. Bazerman and R. J. Lewicki (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage),
68–90.
Liden, R. C., and Graen, G. B. (1980). Generalizability of the vertical dyad linkage
model of leadership. Acad. Manage. J. 23, 451–465. doi: 10.2307/255511
Liden, R. C., and Maslyn, J. M. (1998). Multidimensionality of leader-member
exchange: an empirical assessment through scale development. J. Manage. 24,
43–72. doi: 10.1177/014920639802400105
Little, T. D., Cunningham, W. A., Shahar, G., and Widaman, K. F. (2002). To parcel
or not to parcel: exploring the question, weighing the merits. Stuct. Equ. Model.
9, 151–173. doi: 10.1207/S15328007SEM0902
Liu, S., Lin, X., and Hu, W. (2013). How follower’s unethical behavior is triggered
by leader-member exchange: the mediating effect of job satisfaction. Soc. Behav.
Pers. 41, 357–366. doi: 10.2224/sbp.2013.41.3.357
Lord, R. G., and Maher, K. J. (1991). Leadership and Information Processing. Boston,
MA: Unwin Hyman.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 July 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 1473
fpsyg-11-01473 July 9, 2020 Time: 17:1 # 13
Vriend et al. LMX, Reciprocity, and Intended Unethical Behavior
Martin, R., Guillaume, Y., Thomas, G., Lee, A., and Epitropaki, O. (2016). Leader-
member exchange (LMX) and performance: a meta-analytic review. Pers.
Psychol. 69, 67–121. doi: 10.1111/peps.12100
Masterson, S. S., Lewis, K., Goldman, B. M., and Taylor, M. S. (2000). Integrating
justice and social exchange: the differing effects of fair procedures and treatment
on work relationships. Acad. Manage. J. 43, 738–748. doi: 10.2307/1556364
McClane, W. E. (1991). The interaction of leader and member characteristics in
the leader-member exchange (LMX) model of leadership. Small Group Res. 22,
283–300. doi: 10.1177/1046496491223001
Mesdaghinia, S., Rawat, A., and Nadavulakere, S. (2018). Why moral followers quit:
examining the role of leader bottom-line mentality and unethical pro-leader
behavior. J. Bus. Ethics 159, 491–505. doi: 10.1007/s10551-018-3812-7
Miao, Q., Newman, A., Yu, J., and Xu, L. (2013). The relationship between ethical
leadership and unethical pro-organizational behavior: linear or curvilinear
effects. J. Bus. Ethics 116, 641–653. doi: 10.1007/s10551-012-1504-2
Mulder, L. B., Jordan, J., and Rink, F. (2015). The effect of specific and general
rules on ethical decisions. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 126, 115–129.
doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.11.002
Ordóñez, L. D., Schweitzer, M. E., Galinsky, A. D., and Bazerman, M. H. (2009).
Goals gone wild: the systematic side effects of overprescribing goal setting.
Acad. Manage. Perspect. 23, 6–16. doi: 10.5465/AMP.2009.37007999
Perugini, M., Gallucci, M., Presaghi, F., and Ercolani, A. P. (2003). The personal
norm of reciprocity. Eur. J. Pers. 17, 251–283. doi: 10.1002/per.474
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Moorman, R. H., and Fetter, R. (1990).
Transformational leader behaviors and their effects on followers’ trust in leader,
satisfaction, and organizational citizenship behaviors. Leadersh. Q. 1, 107–142.
doi: 10.1016/1048-9843(90)90009-7
Rickman, N., and Witt, R. (2007). The determinants of employee crime in the UK.
Economica 74, 161–175. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00530.x
Rockstuhl, T., Dulebohn, J. H., Ang, S., and Shore, L. M. (2012). Leader-member
exchange (LMX) and culture: a meta-analysis of correlates of LMX across 23
countries. J. Appl. Psychol. 97, 1097–1130. doi: 10.1037/a0029978
Ronen, S., and Shenkar, O. (2013). Mapping world cultures: cluster formation,
sources and implications. J. Int. Bus. Stud. 44, 867–897. doi: 10.1057/jibs.2013.
42
Rosseel, Y. (2012). lavaan: an R package for structural equation modeling. J. Stat.
Softw. 48, 1–36.
Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., and Medin, D. L. (2009). Sinning saints and saintly sinners.
Psychol. Sci. 20, 523–528. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02326.x
Sackett, P. R. (2002). The structure of counterproductive work nehaviors:
dimensionality and relationships with facets of job performance. Int. J. Sel.
Assess. 10, 5–11. doi: 10.1111/1468-2389.00189
Schweitzer, M. E., Ordonez, L. D., and Douma, B. (2004). Goal setting as a
motivator of unethical behavior. Acad. Manage. J. 47, 422–432. doi: 10.5465/
20159591
Settoon, R. P., Bennett, N., and Liden, R. C. (1996). Social exchange in
organizations: perceived organizational support, leader–member ex- change,
and employee reciprocity. J. Appl. Psychol. 81, 219–227. doi: 10.1037/0021-
9010.81.3.219
Thau, S., Derfler-Rozin, R., Pitesa, M., Mitchell, M. S., and Pillutla, M. M. (2015).
Unethical for the sake of the group: risk of social exclusion and pro-group
unethical behavior. J. Appl. Psychol. 100, 98–113. doi: 10.1037/a0036708
Treviño, L. K., and Brown, M. E. (2005). “The role of leaders in influencing
unethical behavior in the workplace,” in Managing Organizational Deviance, eds
R. D. Kidwell and C. L. Martin (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc),
69–96. doi: 10.4135/9781452231105.n3
Treviño, L. K., den Nieuwenboer, N. A., and Kish-Gephart, J. J. (2014). (Un)Ethical
behavior in organizations. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 65, 635–660. doi: 10.1146/
annurev-psych-113011-143745
Uhl-Bien, M., and Maslyn, J. M. (2003). Reciprocity in manager-subordinate
relationships: components, configurations, and outcomes. J. Manage. 29, 511–
532. doi: 10.1016/S0149-2063(03)00023-0
Umphress, E. E., and Bingham, J. B. (2011). When employees do bad things for
good reasons: examining unethical pro-organizational behaviors. Organ. Sci. 22,
621–640. doi: 10.1111/jvh.12857
Umphress, E. E., Bingham, J. B., and Mitchell, M. S. (2010). Unethical behavior in
the name of the company: the moderating effect of organizational identification
and positive reciprocity beliefs on unethical pro-organizational behavior.
J. Appl. Psychol. 95, 769–780. doi: 10.1037/a0019214
Vriend, T., Jordan, J., and Janssen, O. (2016). Reaching the top and avoiding
the bottom: how ranking motivates unethical intentions and behavior. Organ.
Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 137, 142–155. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.09.003
Wang, T., Long, L., Zhang, Y., and He, W. (2019). A social exchange
perspective of employee–organization relationships and employee unethical
pro-organizational behavior: the moderating role of individual moral identity.
J. Bus. Ethics 159, 473–489. doi: 10.1007/s10551-018-3782-9
Welsh, D. T., and Ordóñez, L. D. (2014). The dark side of consecutive high
performance goals: linking goal setting, depletion, and unethical behavior.
Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 123, 79–89. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.07.
006
Westerman, J. W., Beekun, R. I., Stedham, Y., and Yamamura, J. (2007). Peers
versus national culture: an analysis of antecedents to ethical decision-making.
J. Bus. Ethics 75, 239–252. doi: 10.1007/s10551-006-9250-y
Williams, L. J., and McGonagle, A. K. (2016). Four research designs and a
comprehensive analysis strategy for investigating common method variance
with self-report measures using latent variables. J. Bus. Psychol. 31, 339–359.
doi: 10.1007/s10869-015-9422-9
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2020 Vriend, Said, Janssen and Jordan. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 July 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 1473
